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Abstract—The operation of the power grid is becoming more
stressed, due to the addition of new large loads represented by
Electric Vehicles (EVs) and a more intermittent supply due to
the incorporation of renewable sources. As a consequence, the
coordination and control of projected EV demand in a network of
fast charging stations becomes a critical and challenging problem.
In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic based decentralized
control mechanism to alleviate negative impacts from the EV
demand. The proposed mechanism takes into consideration the
non-uniform spatial distribution of EVs that induces uneven
power demand at each charging facility, and aims to: (i) avoid
straining grid resources by offering price incentives so that
customers accept being routed to less busy stations, (ii) maximize
total revenue by serving more customers with the same amount
of grid resources, and (iii) provide charging service to customers
with a certain level of Quality-of-Service (QoS), the latter defined
as the long term customer blocking probability. We examine three
scenarios of increased complexity that gradually approximate
real world settings. The obtained results show that the proposed
framework leads to substantial performance improvements in
terms of the aforementioned goals, when compared to current
state of affairs.
Index Terms—Electric Vehicles, Distributed Control, Game The-
ory, Demand Response, Performance Evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transportation electrification offers solutions to an array
of current societal issues, ranging from unstable oil prices
to environmental concerns. It is anticipated that a significant
proportion of vehicles (at least 10% of U.S. national fleet
by 2020 [1] and similar targets are set in Europe [2]) will
be electricity powered over the next decade. On the other
hand, the all-electric-range of current EVs is relatively short
compared to gas powered competitors, while the need for
longer travel ranges requires development of a network of
public fast charging facilities. However, the power grid is
not well designed to accommodate the projected EV charg-
ing demand and straining the grid beyond its limits could
easily lead to cascading failures and outages. For instance,
during peak hours the concurrent charging of only two level-
2 chargers can cause a failure of distribution transformers in
residential neighborhoods [1]. Considering the typical amount
of energy transfer to fill up an EV battery (about 24kWh in
30 minutes and equivalent to the daily average consumption
of two households), a key issue becomes how to design
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their architecture so as to strengthen the EV adoption rate.
Obviously, part of a long term solution that accommodates
a large share of EVs involves expansion of charging station
infrastructure, but nevertheless the design issues addressed in
this study would still be critical. In this paper we propose a
decentralized load balancing framework in a network of fast
charging stations. Apart from current literature, due to short
charging sessions the proposed framework assumes that EV
demand is unsplittable and optimally assigns EVs to hard-
capacitated charging stations. To the best of our knowledge,
little attention has been paid to investigate this problem. The
overview of the proposed system is presented in Fig. 1.
Note that a network of charging facilities needs to be
spatially distributed [1], [3] both due to operational limitations
(e.g., transformer rating, line capacity), as well as to meet a
spatially distributed EV demand. However, the two may not be
perfectly aligned, thus introducing the need that the network
operator incentivizes customers to be rerouted to neighboring,
but less congested stations. The most effective incentive comes
in the form of lower electricity prices charged to drivers. In
our framework, we map the behavior of EVs and the system
operator into a game theoretic model. The objective of EV
drivers is to maximize their utility (level of satisfaction) that
depends on the availability of charging service, the price
paid to get the service, as well as the duration needed to
complete the service request. On the other hand, the station
operators want to serve as many customers as possible with
the same amount of grid resources. Next, we discuss the key
contributions of this paper:
• In a network of fast charging stations we propose a power
resource allocation framework that meets QoS targets and
considers the spatio-temporal EV distribution. We also
introduce an Electric Vehicle Admission Control mecha-
nism at each station that employs congestion pricing to
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shape excessive demand.
• We introduce utility functions to capture the behavior
of individual EVs and the network operator for varying
network conditions.
• We introduce a game theoretic framework in which
customer routing and load balancing are achieved through
a pricing mechanism. The latter’s strategy corresponds to
maximizing its profit, while the strategy of the EVs is to
minimizing the associated charging cost.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Comparative Literature Analysis
There has been an increasing body of literature on control
mechanisms for EV charging, while the literature on designs
for charging stations is rather sparse. The predominant as-
sumption for the control of EV charging is that the vehicles
are located either in their drivers’ residencies or at large
parking lots and also depending on the charger technology the
duration of the charging session is of the order of hours. The
vast majority of the literature threats EVs as “smart loads”
and management of their demand is achieved by optimally
adjusting the charging current. Overall, related literature can
be classified into two categories: centralized and decentralized
(distributed) control [2]. In centralized control a network
operator (dispatcher) possesses global information about all
users and to a large extent controls and mandates charging
times, rates etc. For instance, the authors of [9] propose
a direct load management for EV chargings. Similarly, in
our previous work [1], we introduce a central EV allocation
framework for a network of fast charging stations.
In decentralized control, individuals choose their own ser-
vice patterns based on cost minimization principles. In this
case, utilities aim to shape demand profiles by incentivizing
customers via pricing-based control mechanisms. The work
presented in [4] proposes a game theoretic framework to
optimally control the demand of a large scale stationary EV
population. Further, the authors of [5] and [6] present decen-
tralized control mechanisms for EVs and a detailed survey can
be found in [17]. Note that decentralized control eliminates
the need for advanced monitoring tools, whereas centralized
control leads to better utilization of charging resources.
Our proposed framework has the following distinctive fea-
tures. We assume that the EVs are mobile and the charging
session at fast stations takes around 25-30 minutes. Hence,
the primary goal of the EVs is to receive service as quickly
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as possible and extend their driving range. Moreover, the
demand of each individual EV is assumed to be unsplittable
and should be served at exactly one station. Also the load of
each station should be kept below its serving capacity (power
drawn from the grid plus the local energy storage unit) to avoid
disruptions. To that end, the nature of the problem requires
a decentralized load balancing solution for unsplittable EV
demand at hard capacitated charging facilities. Obviously the
routing capabilities depend on the load at each station. If
the customer demand increases substantially, station operators
need to upgrade their storage capabilities and/or increase the
power drawn from the grid. However, the proposed framework
enables station operators to defer power grid upgrades, which
would occur over a broader time horizon and in a more cost
effective way.
Related work on charging station design can be classified
into two categories. The first category includes queueing based
models, where the goal is to evaluate the charging station
performances with respect to long-term statistical metrics e.g.,
blocking probability, waiting time, etc. For example, the work
in [15] proposes an M/M/s queueing based mathematical
model for EV demand for fast charging stations located near
highway exits. On the other hand, the design perspective of the
second category is related to power engineering. The authors
of [13] propose a charging station architecture with a DC bus
system, and similar to our model they employ a local energy
storage unit to alleviate the stress in the power grid. Related
literature is presented in Fig. 2.
B. Previous Work
In this study, we build on our previous work [1] and [3]
that proposed a fast charging station architecture employing
local energy storage and also introduced a stochastic model for
customers arrival and service (both from the grid and the local
energy storage device) to assess its performance (depicted
in Fig. 3). Next, we summarize the dynamics of the single
charging station model introduced in [3]. Each charging station
draws constant power from the power grid, which is expressed
by the number of EVs that can be charged simultaneously, up
to capacity of S vehicles. Similarly a local energy storage is
employed which can accommodate up to R EVs in a fully
charged state. Energy storage will be used to meet spikes in
stochastic power demand that exceed the available grid power
level. Since we always draw constant power from the grid due
to a long term contractual agreement between the grid and the
station, this model also aims to isolate the former from demand
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spikes and hence enhances its reliability.
Given this setting, we represent the single charging station
model as a two dimensional Markov chain with the following
parameters: the arrival of EVs is modeled as a Poisson process
with rate λ, while charging times both from the grid and/or
the storage unit are exponentially distributed with rate µ.
The charging time of the storage unit is also exponentially
distributed with rate ν. As mentioned above, EV charging
occurs first from the grid and if that reaches capacity, only
then is the storage unit engaged. Finally, if a customer comes
to a charging station when all power/energy resources are
used, she could not receive service and consequently will be
“blocked”. The long-term“blocking probability” represents the
QoS performance metric used.
Further, we propose a profit model which prompts station
operators to provide a high QoS to customers. In this model,
station operators receive revenue for each served customer
(pnormal) and pay a penalty for each blocked one (pB) and
pB > pnormal. The penalty captures the fact that customer
blocking leads to dissatisfaction (part of this penalty could
correspond to a voucher given to the customer to alleviate frus-
tration) and degrades the reputation of the station. Combining
the revenue and cost components enables station operators to
size its capacity to maximize its profit.
This work also builds on [1], that evaluated the above
described charging model in a network context using real
world traces obtained from the Seattle public bus system.
The obtained results indicated that the spatial distribution of
EVs follows a Beta distribution, which is also used in the
present study. Consequently, at given times (e.g., rush hour
during weekdays), some regions (e.g., downtown) are busier
than others. Accordingly, stations near a high density area are
busier than other stations and unless an EV routing mechanism
is in place, they would fail to meet preset QoS requirements.
III. NETWORK OF FAST CHARGING STATIONS
We present next, the key building blocks of the proposed
framework, starting with Electric Vehicle Admission Control
(EVAC) at a single charging station. Subsequently, details of
the decentralized control scheme for the network of charging
stations are given. An overview of the system components is
depicted in Fig. 4.
A. Electric Vehicle Admission Control
It is assumed that EV drivers act independently and “self-
ishly” without any consideration for the status of the power
grid. Thus, uncontrolled customer demand can easily lead
to system failures. Such situations can be avoided by an
admission control mechanism that offers monetary incentives
to customers to alter their choice of a charging station. The
goals of EVAC are: (1) attain QoS targets globally, (2) balance
the EV load among neighboring stations, and (3) increase the
total revenue for the network operator by more efficient use
of grid resources. EVAC relies on a pricing mechanism which
adjusts the price of electricity according to the load on the
system. For instance, during rush hours, station operators can
offer relatively lower prices in a neighboring station to shave
the excessive demand at a busier one.
1) System Parameters: Next, we explain the dynamics of
the admission control mechanism employed at a single station
level. If there is no congestion it is assumed that each customer
chooses to go to the nearest station to receive service. In the
EVAC model (depicted in Fig. 5), the arrival rate for each EV
is represented by λ
EV
(t). Each customer enters the pricing
block, and λ
AC
(t) is the proportion of the arrival rate that
accepts the offered price. Similarly, λ
R
(t) is the arrival rate
for routed vehicles from neighboring stations and λ
AD
(t) is
the arrival rate of admitted EVs. On the other hand some
customers may choose to go to busy stations and may not get
service. In order to distinguish customer weights, two types
of EV blocking probability are defined: (i) B
EV
: blocking of
EVs who come to the nearest station (ii) B
RB
: blocking of a
routed EV. Further, when a customer is blocked it is assumed
that he will wait some random time and going to retry the
pricing block. Overall one third of the customers are assumed
to retry and the rest is assumed to leave the system. λ
BL
(t)
and λ
RB
(t) represents the arrival rate for customers who retry
the system.
2) QoS and Pricing Block: The blocking probability, which
represents the percentage of customers denied service in the
long run, corresponds to the Quality-of-Service (QoS) metric.
The performance metric is denoted by (P
BT
) as the weighted
sum of the two blocking types: P
BT
= γ1BEV +γ2BRB where
γ1 + γ2 = 1. Since blocking an EV that is routed from a
neighboring station leads more dissatisfaction, it is assumed
that γ2 > γ1. Note that the goal is to provide a charging
service within a certain blocking probability.
The pricing block is the key component of EVAC. In
general, pricing policies in loss systems can be classified into
three [18] categories. The first category uses a flat pricing
scheme: customers pay by rate or charged by time of use.
The advantage of such policies is that they are easy to
implement and accounting processes are very simple. On the
other hand, such pricing schemes do not consider the state of
the system and hence fail to alleviate congestions. The second
group of policies uses dynamic pricing which monitors the
load of the system continuously to prevent congestions by
adjusting the prices. However in the case of charging stations,
implementation of such pricing policies is rather impractical
as it requires the deployment of advanced real time monitoring
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Fig. 5: Electric Vehicle Admission Control (EVAC)
and measurement infrastructure.
In our framework, a myopic policy that falls in between
the first two categories is employed. Pricing P (t) works as
follows. Let
λ˜
EV
= λ
EV
(t) + λ
BL
(t) + λ
RB
(t), (1)
then unless the arrival rate λ˜
EV
(t) exceeds a certain threshold
λ∗
EV
which is related to the QoS target, the station offers nor-
mal price (the same at each station) pnormal that is acceptable
by each customer. During a congestion period (when QoS
target is violated), λ˜
EV
(t) > λ∗
EV
, the station owner adjust
prices accordingly and offer congestion price pc > pnormal,
so that EVs will potentially prefer to go to neighboring (also
less busy) stations. Note that the “peak hour” price is based
on actual customer load on the system.
Next, we define the threshold at which station operator starts
to offer congestion prices. Given the serving capacity of a
particular charging station (grid power-S, energy storage size-
R, and its technology parameter ν), the optimal arrival rate
is defined as the maximum arrival threshold that the station
performance stays within the QoS target δmax. This can be
calculated by
λ∗
EV
=
{
max λ˜
EV
s.t. PBT (λ˜EV ) ≤ δmax.
(2)
Note that the QoS target δmax is specified in the Service
Level Agreement (SLA). Next, let us define the pricing policy
employed in the Pricing Block P (t). As depicted in Fig. 5,
the pricing block P (t) determines the percentage of customers
who accept the offered price at time t. That is
(λ
EV
(t) + λ
BL
(t) + λ
RB
(t))P (t) = λ
AC
, (3)
which yields
P (t) =
λ
AC
λ
EV
+ λ
BL
+ λ
RB
≤ λ
∗
EV
λ˜
EV
. (4)
This indicates that the percentage of customers who would
accept the offered price is inversely proportional to the load
on the system. Thus, as the arrival rate λ˜
EV
increases, the
station operator will increase the prices and less customers
will accept the price. Note that D(pnormal)=1 meaning that
all customers accept this price. It is well-known that demand
functions describe the sensitivity of customers to the price
changes, that is
p(t) = D−1
(
λ∗
EV
λ
EV
+ λ
BL
+ λ
RB
)
, (5)
where
λ∗
EV
λ
EV
+λ
BL
+λ
RB
is the load on the system. Various
demand functions –for services providing QoS in congested
networks– have been proposed in the literature. In this work,
we use the demand function proposed in [19]. Then, p(t) the
price at time t becomes:
p(t) =

pnormal, if λ˜EV (t) ≤ λ∗EV
pc = pnormal
{
1 + θ
√
− log
(
λ∗
EV
λ
EV
+ λ
BL
+ λ
RB
)}
,
if λ˜
EV
(t) > λ∗
EV
.
(6)
When congestion occurs in a charging station (λ˜
EV
(t) > λ∗
EV
)
resource pricing according to the customer load will improve
the deterioration of the QoS. Parameter θ is set by the utility
operator and it will be further explained in the next section.
B. Resource Allocation in a Network of Fast Charging Sta-
tions
As the limitations of the power grid prevent charging
stations from providing more serving capacity, grid operators
have to consider the spatio-temporal aspects of customer
demand to optimally allocate the available grid power. Let
us assume that N charging stations are employed in a serving
area and let l = 1, 2, ..., N be the index set and N be the set of
charging stations. Further, let Smax be the maximum portion
of generation capacity that the utility can provide to charging
network. Then, considering the spatial distribution of vehicles
and the discretization assumption at each charging station,
network operator aims to maximize the serving capacity by
optimally allocating the power resources. To this end, network
owner solves a two phase resource allocation problem:
a) Phase-I:
min
S
∑
i∈l
P
(i)
BT (λi, Si, Ri) (7)
s.t.
∑
i∈l
Si ≤ Smax (8)
δmin ≤ P (i)BT (Si, Ri, λi) ≤ δmax (9)
Si ∈ Z+, δmin, δmax > 0 (10)
Ri and λi are given, ∀i ∈ l (11)
Further, given any set of station locations and the EV
spatial distribution, arrival rates for each station (λi) can easily
5be calculated from a discrete event simulation [1] (details
provided in the next sections). Also note that the blocking
probability has a lower bound δmin (typically around 0.01%)
which prevents capacity planners from over-provisioning serv-
ing capacity. However, in reality, the result of the optimization
problem (S=(S1,...,SN )) is constrained by the power grid
operation limitations. Hence, another constraint Si ≤ Slimit
that dictates the upper limit for the grid power that can be
drawn, is introduced. Then, if
∑
i∈l
Si < S
max, meaning that
one or more stations cannot get optimal S due to power grid
limitations, the excessive power,
Sexcess = Smax −
∑
i∈l
Si, (12)
is allocated among the neighboring stations inversely propor-
tional to the physical distance between stations.
Let Ψ ⊂ N be the subset charging stations which have ex-
cessive power. Suppose that station j ∈ Ψ has excessive power
Sexcessj . Then in Phase-II a neighboring station-k ∈ N\Ψ gets
an extra Sextrakj amount of power from station-j, that is:
b) Phase-II:
Sextrakj =
⌈
Sexcessj ωk
⌉
,where ωk =
1
d2kj
 ∑
z∈N\Ψ
1
d2zk
−1 ,
(13)
where dzj is the physical distance between stations z and j. A
simple example is discussed next, to better clarify this point.
Assume that four stations serve a neighborhood, and station 1
has excessive power of six units. The remaining three stations
do not have any excessive power and they will share six units
of power according to (13). Let us assume that d21=1, d31=2,
and d41=2 units of distance. Then, the excess power would
be allocated as follows: Sextra21 =4, S
extra
31 =1, and S
extra
41 =1.
Notice that the power allocation is inversely proportional to the
inverse of the square of the physical distance. The main reason
is that in the event of congestion, offering enough incentives
to customers in order to convince them to drive much further
away from their current location is a rather challenging task.
Thus, since the closest station (in this case station 2) will serve
most of station 1’s customers, it gets a bigger portion.
C. Decentralized Control
The motivation for proposing a decentralized control mech-
anism is to analyze how to serve a large population of EVs
under QoS guarantees without requiring significant upgrades
to grid resources. For this purpose, we employ a game theo-
retic framework and propose a decentralized control strategy
to balance the EV load among neighboring charging stations.
The players of the game are the network operator and the EV
drivers. The objective of the “self-interested” EV drivers is
to receive service within QoS guarantees and to minimize the
cost of service, which is proportional to the charging price
and the distance to the charging facility. On the other hand,
the network operator aims to maximize the number of served
customers by incentivizing EV drivers to cooperate and route
customer demand to neighboring stations with relatively lower
utilization, if necessary.
TABLE I: Systems Parameters
Parameter Definition
λEV (t) EV arrival rate (charge request) to the nearest station.
λAC (t) EV arrival rate who accepted the price at the nearest station.
λR (t) Arrival rate of routed (from neighboring stations) customers.
λBL (t) Arrival rate of blocked customers–specific percentage of
EVs retry the system.
λRB (t) Arrival rate of blocked routed customers –specific percent-
age of EVs retry the system.
BEV Blocking probability of customers (who pick the nearest
station).
BRB Blocking probability of the routed customers.
pnormal Normal price accepted by every driver. The same price at
each station.
pcongestionCongestion price depends on the station load.
pB Penalty paid for blocking a customer. Alleviates customer
frustration.
δ QoS target may be different at each station.
λ∗ Maximum allowable arrival rate to support QoS calculated
by (2).
ckinctv Minimum amount of desired savings to accept routing.
cknear Cost to drive to nearest station.
dk Distance vector for each customer k.
θ Vector of price tuning parameter for each station set by
station operator.
S, R, µ Single station parameters. Denotes grid power, energy stor-
age size, and EV charging rate respectively.
Slimit Maximum power that can be drawn by a single station.
As depicted in Fig. 5, the proposed framework relies ex-
tensively on the capability of both parties to communicate.
It is assumed that each charging facility can communicate
with a central unit that can forward pricing signals to mobile
EVs, and influence their preferences. On the other hand
the EVs respond to these signals and play a best response
strategy. In this paper, we assume that there exists a high
fidelity communications infrastructure. However, as part of
future work, we plan to explore the candidate communication
technologies and quantify the effects of their quality of service
to the charging network performance.
1) Game Formulation: Customers have access to charging
station location information and the corresponding pricing of-
fers via the central communication unit. As outlined above, the
role of the network owner is to communicate with each charg-
ing station and forward their price signals; the ultimate goal is
to attract customers to drive to a more distant station to balance
the arrival rate at each station. Thus, the charging network
owner acts as a leader who can commit to a strategy before
followers (customers) can pick their strategies. In this respect,
a Stackelberg game (leader-follower game) is employed to
model this system. First, we define the game in its strategic
form Γ = {{N ∪ K}, {pk}, {Xk∈K}, {Un∈N }, {Uk∈K}},
where N={1, · · · , N} is the set of charging stations and
K={1, · · · ,K} the set of EVs that require charging at a given
time. The strategies of each set of players are as follows. {pk}
denotes a 1×N price vector offered by the charging network
operator. Note that to set the pricing vector station operator
also need to set {θ} for each station. The rationale behind
setting this parameter stems from the fact that in order to
convince people to change their electricity consumption during
rush hours, or in our case where to charge their EVs, the ratio
of peak-to-off-peak hour should be some positive number that
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is greater than one [20]. The parameter θ is set to maintain
such incentives for customers. The EVs strategy, Xk, is to pick
a charging station from N . Un and Uk are the utility functions
that represent the payoffs for the both players. The game in
its extensive form is given in Fig. 6. Next, we describe the
components of the game in detail.
2) EV Customers - Followers: In the absence of any incen-
tives and under the assumption of rationality, each customer
will just choose to go to its nearest charging station. Through
the use of two-way communications, the network operator
aims to route EVs to less busy stations (if necessary) by
offering relatively lower prices, but still avoid penalties for
poor QoS (blocked EVs). The EVs can either Accept to go to
a less busy charging station or Reject and go to the nearest
one. The decision will be driven by the price responsiveness
of the customers. As presented in [21], in order to motivate
EV owners to change their charging behavior, there should be
enough financial incentives. Considering this, the EV strategy
is given below.
EVStrategy =

Accept, if c
knear
− c
kdesrd
≥ c
kinctv
and
P desiredBT ≤ δmax
Reject, otherwise.
(14)
Suppose that customer k, k ∈ K wants to get a service from
station n, n ∈ N . The cost of choosing the nearest station
equals to c
knear
=pn + c
(
d2nk
)
, where pn is the price paid for
the service at station n, and c
(
d2nk
)
is the cost of driving to
station n for EV k. Note that pn equals pnormal when there
is no congestion (λ˜
EV
(t) ≤ λ∗
EV
) at the nearest station n,
and to the congestion price pc otherwise. Similarly, when the
network operator desires to route a vehicle to another station,
it costs c
kdesrd
. As described above there should be strong
enough incentives for drivers to drive extra miles. Hence, to
project customer behavior into our formulation, we assume
that EV k will only agree to go to the desired station if it
gains at least c
kinctv
(e.g., considering current electricity prices
there should be a reasonable level of savings e.g., 10 − 15%
savings).
The pay-off of a single EV is represented by a utility
function that has the following three parameters: the QoS
metric P
BT
, the price at each station pk, and the physical
distance to each station dk. Note that each component of the
utility function corresponds to a 1×N row vector, where the
position of each element is associated with the corresponding
charging station parameter (QoS, service price, and distance).
Also the pricing scheme proposed in section is employed at
each station. Then, the utility function for EV-k becomes:
Uk(PBT ,dk,pk) = h(PBT )en {pk + ck(dk) + fk(dk)} ,
(15)
where h(P
BT
) = eξ(PBT−δ). The h(·) function denotes the
disutility of experiencing high blocking probability [22], δ is
the QoS target and ξ is a constant which reflects how much
the customer values the service (e.g., higher value for when
in urgent need of charging service). This component is used
because blocked customers may retry to get service and high
blocking leads further disutility. These components capture the
dissatisfaction introduced by a high blocking probability. Note
that,
ξ =
{
0, λ ≤ λ∗
ξ ∈ R+, otherwise. (16)
Customer k picks one station n ∈ N and en represents a
column vector comprising of all zeros except for the nth
position which is 1. Similarly, pk is the price vector offered
by the charging network operator. The next term in the utility
function reflects the cost of driving to a charging station
which is a function of distance to each station from the
current location of EV k. Finally, fk(dk) is related with the
dissatisfaction of EV k when it selects to go to a more distant
station. Even though the total cost is lowered, some level of
dissatisfaction occurs due to spending extra time to drive the
extra miles (e.g., time cost etc.).
Thus, the optimization problem of the EVs is a mapping
R → {reject, accept} that gives rise to a vector en, where
(Accept) sets the nth position to 1 while all other remain 0
(Reject). Note that the objective is to minimize the overall
cost. This can be expressed as follows:
arg min
n
h(P
BT
)en {pk + ck(dk) + fk(dk)} (17)
s.t. n ∈ N (18)
where EV k chooses station n and pays pn amount of
money. The second component is the cost of driving: ck(endk)
= p
dr
d2kn (cost of driving one unit of distance times distance
to station n). Similar approaches are proposed in the classic
analysis of Hotelling where customers aim to minimize their
travel costs to get service [23]. The last parameter reflects the
dissatisfaction of customers to drive extra miles. A linear dis-
satisfaction model is employed fk(end)=pdis(dkn−dnearest)
where pdis is the cost of driving one unit of distance, and
(dkn − dnearest) is the total amount of extra miles traveled.
This component captures the real world behavior of customers,
since it is unlikely that one would drive a significant number of
extra miles for limited savings. Finally, the above optimization
problem is subject to the EV having enough stored charge to
drive to station n, which we assume that this is the case (about
1-2 kWh of stored energy).
3) Network Operator - Leader: As described in the previ-
ous section, network operator has the first move advantage to
set the price and he tries to influence the customer preferences.
In the Stackelberg game, the network operator acts as the
leader who aims to coordinate non-cooperative EV charging
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Fig. 7: Blocking probability (% of not served customers)
computation for different station parameters.
behavior so that, he can maximize his profit by minimizing
customer blocking. The strategy of the leader is to tune the
pricing parameter vector θ at each station. Then the offered
1×N price vector becomes a function of vector θ, pk = h(θ).
Also we assume that regulations and policies do forbids the
network operator to take advantage of the EV’s location
information to ask for a high price of those whose battery
levels are very low. Similarly network operator can discard
customers who tries to cheat by re-entering a congested station
many times. The utility function of the network operator
becomes:
arg max
θ
pk(θ)q − pBqB (19)
s.t. pk, q, qB ∈ RN, pB ∈ R+ (20)
where, q is calculated from (17) and equals to en. Similarly,
qB =
{
0, if gets service
en, if blocked.
(21)
and the price vector pk is the same as in (17). Finally, pB is a
scalar and represents priced paid when blocking occurs. The
algorithm for solving the decentralized control is presented in
Algorithm 1.
D. Applicability of the Model
In addition to load balancing in a network of fast charging
stations, the proposed model is relevant to a variety of ap-
plications. In a broader context, the model can be applied to
minimize the cost of wide range of scenarios in contestable
network composed of selfish users with hierarchy in their
decisions (e.g., assignment problem in content distribution
networks and job scheduling in cloud computing). In the case
of smart grid, the supply and demand scheduling problem
for unsplittable loads can be formulated by a hierarchical
game, where the owner of the generators act as the leader
and the consumers act as the followers. More specifically, the
followings can be considered as possible applications.
Consider a demand response management scenario where
multiple electric utility companies and consumers interact each
other, and the goal of the each entity is to maximize its own
Algorithm 1 Decentralized Control
Require: θ ≥ 0, |N | , |K| ∈ Z+
for customer-k ← 1 to K do
network owner offers pk(θ) ∈ RN to Eq.(17)
calculate utility Uk ∈ RN
pick station n=indexOf(min(Uk))
enter station, set e(n)=1
if gets service then
set q=e(n), qB=0
else
set q=0, qB=e(n)
end if
calculate Eq.(19)
end for
benefit. Assume that the cost of the utilities is mainly deter-
mined by the power generation method (e.g., unit commitment
vs. economic dispatch), associated cost for GHG emissions,
and the risk of power outages due to congestions, especially in
transmission network. In this case, a network operator can set
prices to influence the customers served by high operating cost
utilities to other utility options. This will allow consumers to
receive discounted services for their deferrable and unsplittable
demand (e.g., washing machine). A similar scenario can be
applied to energy trading among microgrids and the minimum
cost assignments can be orchestrated via leader (sellers)-
follower (buyers) game.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Single Charging Station
The motivation for the proposed control scheme is based
on the dynamics of the underlying charging station model
presented in section II-B. In this section, we present numerical
examples to highlight the relationship between the charging
station serving capacity (grid power S and storage unit R),
customer demand (λ(t)), and the station policy (QoS). Tech-
nological constraints for the EV charging rate and the local
storage unit are held constant throughout the simulations and
set as µ=2 and ν=4. A detailed discussion on the performance
of different charging technologies and computation techniques
are presented in [3]. In Fig. 7, the blocking probability (PBT )
is evaluated for different set of station parameters (by solving
the steady state probability distribution of the underlying
Markov chain, see [1]). Note that as the station resources
increase, more customers can be served. However, the power
grid limits the serving resources drawn from the grid and the
customer demand (λ) is mainly determined by the location of
the charging station and the time of the day. Therefore, the idea
behind the proposed customer routing scheme is to off-load
the traffic to neighboring stations when the grid resources are
inadequate. This is further clarified in the next two examples.
In the first one, we present the profit model (details are
given in section II-B) for a single charging station for vary-
ing customer demand. We assume that each customer pays
pnormal=4 units of money for the charging service. On the
other hand, if a customer is blocked, station operator pays a
penalty pB=5 units of money. As explained before the penalty
motivates station operator to provide a good QoS level. The
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Fig. 8: Evaluation of single charging station dynamics.
7am 10am 3pm 8pm 12am40
43
46
49
52
55
58
60
Hour of the Day
To
ta
l A
rri
va
l R
at
e
Congesion at
Stations 2 and 3
Station 2 congestion
begins
Station 3 
congestion 
begins
Station 2 congestion
ends
Station 3 
congestion
 begins
(a) Daily customer demand.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.50.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Leader’s Strategy θ
B
lo
ck
in
g 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 
 
Station−2(θ2)
Station−3(θ3)
(b) Leader’s strategy.
7am 10am 3pm 8pm 12am15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
%
 o
f I
nc
re
as
e 
In
 S
er
ve
d 
D
em
an
d
 
 
Power Allocation with Customer Routing
Power Allocation
(c) % of increase in served EVs.
Fig. 9: Numerical evaluation-II.
20 30 40 50 600
10
20
30
40
50
Arrival Rate − λ
(%
) P
erc
en
tag
e o
f
 
Cu
sto
m
er
 D
em
an
d
 
 
Station−1
Station−2
Station−3
Station−4
Station−5
(a) Load balancing in a network of fast
charging stations.
7am 10am 3pm 8pm 12am0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Hour of the Day
W
ei
gh
te
d 
Su
m
 o
f
 
B
lo
ck
in
g 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
tie
s
 
 
Power Allocation
No Allocation
Power Allocation with Customer Routing
(b) Weighted sum of blocking probability
for all stations.
7am 9am 11am 1pm 3pm 5pm 7pm 9pm 11pm 12am0
50
100
150
200
Hour of the Day
N
et
 R
ev
en
ue
 
 
Power Allocation
Power Allocation with Customer Routing
No Allocation
(c) Network-wide (five stations) net revenue
comparison.
Fig. 10: Numerical evaluation-III.
results presented in Fig. 8(a) shows that there is an optimal
traffic regime for individual stations for a given set of station
parameters. Note that under light traffic (λ=[1,2] )station is
making a negative profit mainly because the energy storage
acquisition cost and the cost of grid power outweighs the
revenue gained from the customers. Similarly, under heavy
traffic the cost of customer blockings decreases the station
revenue. To that end, the proposed scheme aims to balance
the load among the station network by routing customers to
idle neighboring stations.
Another goal of the routing scheme is to ensure QoS
levels at each charging stations. The QoS targets are mainly
determined by the station operator, and whenever the cus-
tomer demand exceeds the blocking target, station operator
employs pricing-based routing scheme to balance the load.
Suppose that station has the following resources S=5 and R=5
and for sake of simplicity arrival rate follows a sine wave
λ=5+1.75 sin(2pit/80). Furthermore, the station policy for the
QoS is set to 1%, meaning that station operator wants to serve
99% of customers. Then, as depicted in Fig. 8(b), the proposed
routing scheme is applied during the congestion periods from
time slot 22 to 58.
B. Network of Charging Stations
In this part, we illustrate the proposed resource allocation
and EV routing scheme. The simulation scenario is set as
follows: the charging network comprises of five stations in
a 30×30 unit square area. The coordinates of the locations of
them are: (5, 25), (10, 10), (25, 25), (15, 15), and (25, 5) for
stations 1 to 5 respectively. To capture the spatial variability
of EVs we used the following mixture distribution, whose
parameters are calibrated based on results from [1].
f(X) =
{
15×Be(4.42, 0.763), 0 ≤ X ≤ 15 (22)
f(Y ) =
{
15×Be(2.42, 0.799), 0 ≤ Y ≤ 15 (23)
where Be denotes the Beta distribution function. The spatial
distribution and the locations of the stations are given in
Fig. 8(c). As depicted in this figure, half of the EV population
resides in the lower left of the area (e.g., downtown region)
under consideration, while the remaining half in the rest of
the area. Given this spatial distribution of customers and
in the absence of a decentralized control mechanism, EV
demand for each charging node would be 1%, 50%, 42%, 2%,
and 5% for stations 1-5, respectively. As a baseline scenario
9we assume that no allocation or customer routing of any
kind takes places. To begin with, let us assume that the
utility company can provide Smax=39 units of power and the
distribution grid constraint Slimit=13. for the baseline scenario
stations get S=[7, 8, 8, 8, 8] respectively. In this case the
blocking probability performance of five stations would be
B=[∼0, 0.46, 0.36, ∼0, ∼0]. This leads to a highly undesir-
able situation; stations 2 and 3 performs a very bad service,
whereas neighboring stations are over-provisioned and the
serving resources are wasted. Our two step framework, optimal
resource allocation and customer routing will improve the
system performance, hence the percentage of served customers
significantly. Details are presented next.
Given the customer demand for each station as the baseline
scenario, the serving capacity is allocated among the stations
according to equations (7) and (13). Then the optimal resource
allocation would be B=[6, 13, 13, 3, 4]. Note that due
to power grid constraints, the excess power Sexcess2 =5 and
Sexcess3 =2 is allocated to stations 1, 4, and 5 as [5,1,1].
Moreover, the charge rate to satisfy one EV charging request
is µ1= . . . =µ5=2, while the charging rate from local energy
storage unit is ν1= . . . =ν5=3. Also, each station employs an
energy storage size of Ri = 8, ∀i ∈ N .
The details of the discrete event simulation is presented
next. The network-wide charging requests (or arrival rate) is
depicted in Fig. 9(a). EV demand at each station is propor-
tional to the traffic load calculated above; for instance, for
station 2 it is about λ2(t=10am)=52 × 0.5 = 26 (EVs arrive
in one hour). The charging station operator aims to provide
service to the EVs with QoS guarantee δ = 0.05 (at least 95%
of the customers will be served at all times) and dissatisfaction
parameter ξ=0.1 for all customers. Based on these charging
station parameters, the leader (system operator) solves (2) and
initiates the routing game only when the arrival rate exceeds
this threshold, which corresponds to the following thresholds
for each individual station: λ∗i = [6.7, 23.4, 23.4, 3.3, 5.0].
Since it may be challenging (and possibly wasteful) to update
arrival rates in real time, we set 15 minute intervals at which
arrival rates are recalculated. Just to clarify how resource
allocation improves the system performance, let us compare it
with baseline scenario at 4pm according to weighted sum of
overall system performance using the formula given below:∑
i∈l
wiBi, where wi =
λi∑
i∈l
λi
(24)
where λi=λ˜EV Then, the weighted sum of the blocking prob-
abilities for the baseline scenario and the power resource
allocation would be 0.38 and 0.10 which leads to more
efficient use of grid resources.
The details of the customer routing framework is discussed
next. In the absence of congestion (λi < λ∗i ), customers pay
the operator pnormal=4 units, whereas if EVs are blocked the
operator rewards them with pblock=6. As mentioned before,
this cost is a penalty to the operator for poor service which
can impact customer loyalty and its long term reputation.
Also, to calculate blocking probabilities we set γ1=0.45 and
γ2=0.55. For the kth EV, ckinctv is a uniformly distributed
random number in the interval [0.75, 1.0] and pdis is a uni-
formly distributed random number (per unit of distance) in
the interval [0.02, 0.05]. We assume that driving duration is
linearly correlated with distance (based on an average speed
of 40 mph). Currently popular EV models (e.g., Nissan Leaf)
exhibit 0.22 kWh/mile energy consumption; thus, we set pdrive
= 0.03 per unit of distance.
Next, the strategy of the leader (setting the tuning pa-
rameter vector θ) is given. As stations 1, 4, and 5 operate
under light traffic, the operator is motivated shape excessive
demand at stations 2 and 3 and route customers to these
stations. For the given arrival rate at (λ(t = 4pm)), we set
θ1=θ4=θ5=0.5 and investigated how θ2 and θ3 affects the
blocking probability at these stations. As depicted in Fig. 9(b)
station 2 and 3 violate δmax=0.05 QoS policy, however station
operator increases θ2 and θ3 to set the congestion prices and
start routing customers to neighboring stations. Our customer
routing framework enables stations to meet SLA agreements.
Note that θ2 and θ3¿0.4 does not lead to further reduction in
blocking probability because the neighboring stations also hit
λ∗ and does not accept more customers. Similarly, Fig. 10(a)
shows the load balancing framework. Notice that for low
customer demand there is no need for customer routing scheme
because the regional serving capacity resources suffice the
demand. On the other hand as stations become more congested
customers are routed to neighboring stations. One important
point of consideration is that since station 1 is physically more
close to congested stations 2 and 3, more customers accept
(almost 11% of the population) to go to this station. In Fig.
9(c) we compute the percentage of increase in the number of
served customers respect to base line scenario. For the given
simulation setting, the proposed framework serves close 50%
more customers with the same amount of grid resources.
The proposed decentralized control mechanism is simulated
with the given set of parameters and compared to baseline and
power allocation scenarios. The performance of the most con-
gested station (station 2) is presented in Fig. 10(b). It can be
seen that the percentage of served customers can be increased
significantly by employing proposed framework. We further
compare the network-wide net revenue. As depicted Fig. 10(c),
the network operator optimally allocates grid resources and
do load balancing, the utilization of each charging station will
increase, and hence more customers will be served with the
same amount of grid resources. Hence, by employing proposed
framework network operator increases her profit tremendously.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a Stackelberg game theoretic
based control mechanism to manage a population of self-
interested mobile EVs. The aim of the leader (Network
Operator) is to serve more customers with the same amount
of grid resources, while the goal of the EV followers (EV
drivers) is to get the charging service at a minimum cost.
Utility functions are developed to represent the behavior of
both parties.
As a future work, we are aiming to investigate the com-
munication components involved in making this scheme op-
erational. Charging stations communicate with customers via
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smart applications using 3G/4G wireless technologies. The
successful deployment of the coordination mechanism dis-
cussed in this paper, heavily depends on the availability of
the necessary communication infrastructure to ensure reliable
information dissemination. In our framework, mobile EVs use
wireless communication technologies to locate and retrieve
pricing information. On the other hand, wireless communi-
cations enable the network operator to monitor station usage,
update prices and forward them to EVs. Hence, it is crucial
to identify the communication system requirements (e.g.,
communication losses, delays etc.) and quantify its impact on
the performance of the charging stations.
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